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Do gender quotas reduce the quality of politicians elected to a legislature? For the first time 
in the literature, we address this question by examining the quality of ‘quota women’ 
compared to their non-quota colleagues at three stages of their political career – their 
electoral performance, their qualifications for political office, and their post-election 
legislative career trajectories. Drawing on the unique case of Britain following the 1997 
general election, we find no significant difference between the quality of ‘quota women’ and 
their non-quota colleagues. Voters do not punish ‘quota women’ at the ballot box; ‘quota 
women’ are as equally qualified for political office as their colleagues, and the gatekeepers 
of executive office do not discriminate against ‘quota women’ in frontbench promotions. 
Considering this, we conclude by asking whether the similarity of ‘quota women’ to their 














Measuring the quality of politicians elected by gender quotas – are they any different? 
 
In principle, people who have suffered discrimination shouldn’t practise it. And in 
practise, women who’ve come through this route have skipped several steps so their 
skills may be deficient. Often they’re women who’ve come through various women’s 
organisations, and they’re a bit….well, limp. It may explain why so few of Blair’s 
Babes made any mark in the House of Commons. 
          (Edwina Currie, quoted by Ridge, 2013)  
Even though gender quotas are increasingly used worldwide to speed up the process of 
getting more women into elected political office (Krook, 2010), they remain the subject of 
public debate and criticism. Opponents of gender quotas frequently cite the likely inferiority 
of ‘quota women’ compared to non-quota women and men (Bacchi, 2006; Franceschet and 
Piscopo, 2008; Murray 2010b). 
But to what extent is this argument accurate? Is there any evidence that ‘quota women’ differ 
in their electoral performance, their qualifications for political office, and their descriptive 
representation at different levels of the legislative and executive hierarchy? While existing 
cross-national work has examined the impact of gender quotas (Franceschet and Piscopo, 
2008; Murray, 2010; 2012; O’Brien, 2012; Sater, 2012), electoral behaviour (Cutts et al; 
2008; Cutts and Widdop, 2012) and political career patterns (Franceschet and Piscopo, 2008; 
Murray, 2010a), this work has not considered the impact of sex and quotas over different 
stages of a political career. Here we seek to redress this imbalance in the literature by 
examining the impact of the all-women shortlist gender quota at the 1997 British general 
election on politicians’ electoral performance in 1997, their qualifications for office, and 
finally their career trajectory once elected to the legislature in the period from 1997 to 2010. 
Our findings suggest that ‘quota women’ are not discriminated at the ballot box, are equally 
qualified, and are not perceived negatively by gatekeepers to the executive. These findings 
not only contribute to public debate and the expanding literature on equality guarantees and 
candidate quality, but also pose questions about whether such similarity restricts or enhances 
the potential for gender quotas to result in transformative substantive representation.   
Gender Quotas: Existing Evidence 
Numerous scholars have described how different countries, states, or regions adopt different 
types of gender quotas (Caul, 2001; Dahlerup and Friedenvall, 2010; Krook, 2010; 2013; 
O’Brien, 2012; Sater, 2012; Zetterberg, 2008). Quotas can be classified in four main ways : 
according to the source of their mandate (legal, constitutional, partisan); the strength of 
coercion behind their implementation; the stage at which they impact the electoral process, 
usually in terms of whether the focus is on inputs or outcomes (i.e. a quota focused on a 
minimum percentage of women across all electoral candidates or reserved seats within a 
legislature, respectively); and the ways in which they ‘attempt to reform the dynamics of 
candidate selection’ (Krook, 2013). Different types of quota disrupt the norms of existing 
political practice in varying ways and at different stages. Critics of gender quotas stress that 
these norms, embedded in the processes of candidate selection or electoral seat distribution, 
are meritocratic, and that gender quotas undermine this (Dahlerup, 2007; Dahlerup and 
Friedenvall, 2010; Murray, 2012). Rainbow Murray explains how this criticism assumes that 
‘by prioritizing traits such as sex over more objective measures of ability, gender quotas 
might jeopardize the quality of parliamentarians’ (2012, p.27).  
As such, scholars of gender quotas have generally utilised measures of candidate quality and 
success borne of comparing women elected to a legislature via a quota of some sort with 
those women and men who were not (Franceschet and Piscopo, 2012; Murray, 2010b, 2012; 
O’Brien, 2012). The dominant characteristics of men and women elected to a legislature prior 
to the implementation of a quota, including their political or occupational experience are seen 
as a de facto measure of quality. Following this logic, if women elected via a quota diverge 
from these patterns, they are deemed, to use the term of Murray, not ‘up to the job’ (2010b). 
It may be problematic to interpret any divergence in men and women’s previous experience 
as an indicator of the inadequacy of women candidates; if women politicians’ backgrounds 
map on to the structural inequalities generally faced by women in society then this constitutes 
at least part of the rationale for instituting a quota regime in the first place. Conceptions of 
merit may simply reflect dominant male attributes.  
This article will adopt the position of much existing scholarship in this area, and assess the 
‘quality’ of women elected to the House of Commons by ‘All Women Shortlists’ (AWS) in 
comparison to men and women elected through traditional means. Although there are clear 
normative questions raised by the assumptions underlying such an approach, we deem it still 
to be a useful method of assessing the impact of gender quotas in the British case and 
contextualising this in the existing literature. Despite their flaws, these measures are those 
most commonly used to assess the quality of politicians of both sexes, and as such, engaging 
with them not only locates our research within a broader body of comparative scholarship, 
but additionally speaks to non-academic writing on the topic of qualification for political 
office, highlighting its wider relevance (Oborne, 2007; Riddell, 1993). 
Measuring Candidate Quality: Existing Evidence 
Differences in the design of gender quotas, as well as case-specific institutional, cultural, and 
system-level differences mean that many existing findings are not directly generalizable to 
the British, or any other, case. The type of gender quota also affects the ease with which 
‘quota women’ can be identified (Krook, 2009; 2013) For example, in the cases of both 
France and Argentina, the gender quota was a legislative quota, and as such, all women 
elected following its implementation could be dubbed ‘quota women’. A contrasting case is 
that of Rwanda, which holds reserved seats for women in parliament whilst additionally 
electing women through traditional processes of selection also followed by men (Bauer, 
2012; Bauer and Burnet, 2013; Devlin and Elgie, 2008). As such, ‘quota women’ are elected 
alongside other women who do not directly benefit from the use of a gender quota. Such a 
situation is similar to that in Britain, and this type of quota allows for the more effective 
untangling of the effect of gender quotas from broader sex effects (Dahlerup and Friedenvall, 
2010).  
Electoral Performance 
In terms of electoral performance, a key question is whether or not voters punish ‘quota 
women’ candidates more than non-quota candidates from both sexes. Electoral performance 
can be interpreted as a measure of quality in the sense that if a party suffers from electoral 
decline following the implementation of a quota, this could reflect a perceived lack of quality 
on the part of the candidate by the voters. Cross national efforts to examine whether this is 
the case have been largely undermined by a lack of aggregate data, candidate information, the 
different types of electoral systems and the nature of the gender quota implemented. 
Moreover, any meaningful findings may also be subject to scepticism due to statistical issues 
such as selection bias because of the problem of unobserved heterogeneity and the possibility 
of endogeneity bias, both of which can lead to bias estimates if not corrected (Cutts and 
Widdop, 2012). Two notable exceptions stem from the British literature. In 2005, the British 
Labour party adopted ‘all women shortlists’ (AWS) in thirty constituencies and despite the 
election of 23 AWS candidates, the defeat of Maggie Jones in Blaenau Gwent (a traditional 
Labour heartland seat with a 19,000 majority) to ex-Labour Welsh AM Peter Law (who 
fought the election on an explicit anti-AWS ticket), brought the issue of gender quotas to the 
forefront of British politics. Even though some scholars, from descriptive evidence, claimed 
that AWS had a negative effect on Labour performance in 2005 (Curtice et al, 2005), another 
study questioned this perceived wisdom providing evidence that there was no significant anti-
AWS effect and that being a new candidate was far more important and one masked by AWS 
in 2005 (Cutts et al, 2008). A similar study of the 2010 election also found no evidence of 
anti-AWS effect, and this did not vary by incumbency status: any perceived AWS effect was 
not a sex effect but simply the result of being a new candidate (Cutts and Widdop, 2012). 
Qualifications for office 
Gender quotas themselves introduce a formal qualification for office, based on sex, that did 
not exist prior to their introduction. When scholars of quotas examine whether or not the 
women selected as a result of the quota are ‘qualified’, however, they focus their attention on 
the informal qualifications for office that did previously exist – primarily, age, education, 
occupational experience, and political experience (Franceschet and Piscopo, 2008; 2012; 
Murray, 2010b; 2012; O’Brien, 2012). Although these largely hold informal power (with the 
exception of legal restrictions on the minimum age of political candidates), the dominance of 
certain patterns renders them de facto qualifications.  
It is common for national-level legislators to gain their first election to office in middle-age, 
with youth seen as an indicator of inexperience (Borchert and Zeiss, 2003). This is as true of 
women elected via a gender quota as any other politicians. In France and elsewhere, scholars 
have found no statistical differences between the ages of men, and quota and non-quota 
women in legislatures (Franceschet and Piscopo, 2012, Murray 2010b, 2012). The 
educational backgrounds of ‘quota women’ are also broadly similar to those of politicians 
elected through traditional means. While there is some evidence that women legislators in 
Argentina are significantly more likely to hold a degree than their male colleagues 
(Franceschet and Piscopo, 2012) other studies have found no statistically significant 
differences in the backgrounds of women holding reserved parliamentary seats and non-quota 
representatives of either sex (O’Brien, 2012).  
Occupational and political experience is also considered to act as a de facto qualification for 
political office. Murray finds that the occupational and political backgrounds of women 
parliamentarians in France were slightly different from men; women were less often drawn 
from professional occupations, had less senior local political experience and had served fewer 
terms in local office; but crucially women elected in the parity period were more like male 
representatives than women elected before 2007 (Murray, 2010b; 2012). Such findings 
suggest that quotas help women overcome structural inequalities that limit their access to 
elected office (Murray, 2012). Evidence from Argentina suggests that women politicians are 
equally likely as men to have previously held legislative posts, although women do have less 
prior executive experience (Franceschet and Piscopo, 2012). In Uganda, reform of the quota 
regime, so that women are elected by the population rather than an elite electoral college, has 
led to the diversification of the backgrounds of ‘quota women’, who like their male 
colleagues remain members of the political elite but are no longer staunch party loyalists 
(O’Brien, 2012).  
Legislative careers and behaviour 
Within many political systems, true legislative and political power lies in executive positions. 
In order to reach these positions, legislators must convince gatekeepers of executive office 
that they are worthy of them. As such, being selected as suitable for executive office by its 
gatekeepers is an indication of perceived effectiveness or of political ability, both of which 
‘quota women’ have been accused of not possessing. Is there evidence that, once elected, the 
legislative career and behaviours of ‘quota women’ differ from their non-quota colleagues, 
both male and female? Pär Zetterberg, in his study of Mexican ‘quota women’ in two state 
legislatures, finds ‘that quota women are no more likely to suffer from tokenism, 
marginalisation or invisibilisation than other women legislators’ (Zetterberg, 2008: p.455). 
Scholars of the Rwandan parliament also find ‘no significant differences between the quota 
deputies and the directly elected deputies emerged’ (Devlin and Elgie, 2008: p.245). In 
France, Murray finds no evidence that women elected after the introduction of parity 
legislation were less active in the legislature than men (Murray, 2010b).  
Britain: A case study approach 
Cross-national research on the impact of gender quotas remains limited reflecting the 
difficulties in generalising key findings across countries given the differences in both the 
nature of the quota as well as the institutional and cultural context of each individual case 
(Krook, 2013). For instance, criticisms of ‘quota women’ in a system implementing a 
legislative quota applicable to candidates from all political parties, elected using a system of 
proportional representation, will be different to a case where only some women within a 
single party are elected via a quota in a majoritarian electoral system.i And while some of the 
most informative scholarly work on quotas has been country specific case studies, no one has 
taken a holistic approach and examined sex and the impact of quotas – electoral performance, 
qualifications for office and legislative careers and behaviour – over time. Here we use 
Britain as a case study to do just that. 
We use Britain for a number of reasons. Firstly, there is a recent history of quotas being used 
to select candidates for election to the Westminster parliament. In three of the last four 
general elections since 1992, the Labour party has used all women shortlists to select 
candidates in a specific number of constituencies. This provides us with the longevity to 
assess a subset of first time elected quota and non-quota candidates and examine any 
differences in terms of qualifications for office and subsequent legislative careers.  
Secondly, Labour’s commitment to equality guarantee has sparked political debate both 
within its own party and across the political spectrum and has led to much public furore since 
its introduction. The implementation of parliamentary sex quotas by the Labour party before 
the 1997 general election reflected both its commitment to parity of representation between 
women and men at Westminster and an electoral goal of reducing the Conservatives’ historic 
advantage among women voters. In the 1997 general election, 38 AWS candidates were 
selected by their Labour constituency parties. Further legislation permitting the use of AWS 
was not enacted until after the 2001 general election, and following the decline in Labour 
women MPs from 101 to 95, it was reintroduced for the 2005 general election with 30 AWS 
candidates selected. The party encouraged the voluntary use of AWS where the sitting 
Labour MP was retiring, and threatened imposition if enough volunteer seats were not 
forthcoming (Cutts et al, 2008). Despite the loss of one its safest seats to an independent 
candidate standing on an anti-AWS ticket , Labour persevered with AWS in the 2010 general 
election, with 64 AWS candidates selected, 45 of who were in incumbent seats (Cutts and 
Widdop, 2012). Nonetheless, the quota issue continues to spark controversy in Britain and 
remains the subject of both public and political debate. As the former Liberal Democrat 
leader Paddy Ashdown recently commented, “I don't like women shortlists or shortlists for 
anybody. I find them illiberal and I find them demeaning to those who are put in that 
position, and I find them potentially insulting” (Ashdown quoted by Ridge, 2013).  
Thirdly, due to cross-country variance in the type of quotas implemented, data suitability is 
often a key problem for scholars analysing their impact. It is even more of an issue if the aim 
is to examine differences in the quality of quota and non-quota candidates over time. To our 
knowledge, only in Britain are there existing datasets that can fulfil this task. 
 
Hypotheses 
Using Britain as a case study, we test the validity of claims that the quality of ‘quota women’, 
as candidates and elected politicians, differs from their non-quota colleagues at three stages 
of a political career. Differences in electoral performance allow us to assess whether voters 
distinguish between AWS candidates and candidates selected in a traditional way. Variations 
in the age, occupational and political experience, and education of representatives prior to 
election provide an assessment of the qualifications for office. Whilst variations in post-
election political careers allow us to assess whether ‘quota women’ are perceived as less 
capable than their colleagues by the gatekeepers of executive office (in this case the Prime 
Minister), and combined with our findings on candidate quality, the veracity of this 
perception. As noted above, other country specific case studies have examined whether 
differences between quota and non-quota candidates exist. However, none of this scholarly 
work has examined a particular cohort through all three stages of a political career as we do 
here. Nonetheless, the existing literature does provide us with some expectations for our 
findings. As a consequence, from this literature, we test the following hypotheses: 
H0(1): ‘Quota women’ do not differ from their non-quota colleagues in terms of their 
electoral performance in the 1997 general election. 
HA(1) Being a ‘Quota woman’ had a negative effect on electoral performance relative to 
non-quota colleagues in the 1997 general election. 
H0(2): ‘Quota women’ do not differ from their non-quota colleagues in terms of their age, 
occupational and political experience. 
HA(2A, 2B) ‘Quota women’ differ from their non-quota colleagues in terms of their age and 
occupation (2A) and political experience (2B). 
H0(3): ‘Quota women’ do not differ from their non-quota colleagues in terms of their 
legislative career path. 




Our main source of data is the 1997 general election constituency data file. This aggregate 
level dataset is used to examine the three stages of a political career and contains electoral 
and political information for those candidates from the three main parties who stood for 
election in 1997. This aggregate file for all constituencies is used to determine whether the 
electoral performance of ‘quota women’ differed from non-quota candidates. However, to 
address the other two hypotheses relating to political experience and legislative career, we 
only use a subset of this file. This subset only contains those candidates, both quota and non-
quota, elected for the first time in the 1997 general election.  
For the first time, we examine whether selection as an AWS candidate in 1997 had a 
detrimental effect on their electoral performance. In total, there were 38 AWS candidates 
selected by constituency Labour parties to stand in the 1997 general election, seven of which 
were in Labour held seats (see Table 1). Of the 38 AWS candidates, three were unsuccessful: 
those standing in the Isle of Wight, Oxford West and Abingdon and Woodspring. Our 
constituency level dataset contains variables that differentiate candidate status by sex, quota, 
and incumbency. In order to test possible relationships between ‘quota women’ and Labour 
party performance it was necessary to construct additional variables. Ten socio-economic 
variables were obtained from the 1991 census to reflect established social cleavages (Cutts, 
2006), and a principal components analysis was run to remove any potential collinearity from 
the variables (see Appendix A1 for full details). Three factors were extracted and saved in the 
dataset that clearly reflected the characteristics of the parliamentary constituencies. Factor 1 
captures the class structure; Factor 2 describes the affluent suburban constituencies, while 
Factor 3 reflects the more rural constituencies with an ageing population. We also include the 
sex of candidate variable for both opposition parties (Cutts and Widdop, 2012). Historically, 
sex discrimination has existed in all of the main parties’ selection procedures despite no 
evidence of an electoral penalty for women candidates in British elections (Cutts et al, 2008; 
Lovenduski, 2001). We also derive party spending variables as measures of local 
campaigning given the established impact of party activism on electoral outcomes (Cutts, 
2006; Fieldhouse and Cutts; 2009). While the inclusion of demographic and other controls 
allows us to gauge the underlying pattern of support for Labour, in order to provide a 
rigorous test of whether there was an AWS effect in 1997, we also derive a prior vote share 
variable to take account of other factors not accounted for in the previous analyses.  
 
Table 1: All Women Shortlist Candidates in the 1997 General Election 
AWS 1997 Non-Incumbent Seat Candidate Region Winning Party 92 Lab Behind 92 
1. Aberdeen South Anne Begg Scotland Conservatives 13.46% 
2. Amber Valley Judy Mallaber EM Conservatives 2.10% 
3. Basildon Angela E Smith E.Anglia Conservatives 4.37% 
4. Birmingham Edgbaston Gisela Stuart WM Conservatives 9.94% 
5. Brentford and Isleworth Ann Keen London Conservatives 2.83% 
6. Burton Janet Dean WM Conservatives 6.99% 
7. Calder Valley Chris McCafferty Y&H Conservatives 7.98% 
8. Cardiff North Julie Morgan Wales Conservatives 6.22% 
9. Cleethorpes Shona McIsaac Y&H Conservatives 12.02% 
10. Colne Valley Kali Mountford Y&H Conservatives 12.23% 
11. Conwy Betty Williams Wales Conservatives 7.97% 
12. Crawley Laura Moffat SE Conservatives 3.65% 
13. Erewash Liz Blackman EM Conservatives 9.01% 
14. Falmouth & Camborne Candy Atherton SW Conservatives 7.70% 
15. Isle of Wight Deborah Gardiner SE Conservatives 41.92% 
16. Keighley Ann Cryer Y&H Conservatives 6.56% 
17. Luton South Margaret Moran SE Conservatives 1.03% 
18. Mitcham & Morden Siobhan McDonagh London Conservatives 3.39% 
19. Milton Keynes SW Phyllis Starkey SE Conservatives 9.16% 
20. Northampton North Sally Keeble EM Conservatives 7.17% 
21. Oxford West & Abingdon Susan Brown SE Conservatives 30.11% 
22. Peterborough* Helen Clark E.Anglia Conservatives 11.70% 
23. Plymouth Sutton Linda Gilroy SW Conservatives 2.01% 
24. Preseli Pembrokeshire Jackie Lawrence Wales Conservatives 1.38% 
25. Redditch Jacqui Smith WM Conservatives 6.75% 
26. Stirling Anne McGuire Scotland Conservatives 0.56% 
27. Stockton South Dari Taylor North Conservatives 9.44% 
28. Stourbridge Debra Shipley WM Conservatives 10.56% 
29. Welwyn Hatfield Melanie Johnson SE Conservatives 11.53% 
30. Wolverhampton SW Jenny Jones WM Conservatives 9.43% 
31. Woodspring Debbie Sander SW Conservatives 40.94% 
AWS 1997 Incumbent Seat Candidate Region Second Party 92 Lab Maj 92 
1. Ayr, Carrick and Cumnock Sandra Osborne Scotland Conservatives 4.18% 
2. Forest of Dean Diana Organ SW Conservatives 1.40% 
3. Lincoln Gillian Merron EM Conservatives 1.86% 
4. Liverpool, Garston Maria Eagle NW Conservatives 26.09% 
5. Liverpool, Riverside Louise Ellman NW Lib Dems 57.56% 
6. Regents Park & Kensington N Karen Buck London Conservatives 7.28% 
7. Slough Fiona Mactaggart SE Conservatives 0.07% 
*Helen Brinton (later Clark) 
To examine political experience, we took a subset of this aggregate level dataset and added 
details of the demographic, personal, occupational and political characteristics of those 178 
Labour MPs elected to the House of Commons for the first time in 1997. Of these 178 elected 
MPs, 64 were women, with 35 of those women elected through all-women-short-lists. This 
newly elected cohort also included those 40 Labour MPs elected for the first time at the 2005 
general election, 26 of whom were women and 14 men.ii Put simply, this data allows us to 
compare the age, previous occupation, educational attainment and previous political 
experience of 1997 Labour entrants; all of which have been used as measures of ‘quality’ in 
other studies (Franceschet and Piscopo, 2012; Murray, 2010b; O’Brien, 2012).  
Finally, using the same newly elected 1997 cohort, we compare the post-election career 
trajectories of Labour parliamentarians first elected in 1997, asking whether these trajectories 
differ for those women selected from an AWS compared to their colleagues selected through 
traditional methods. This cohort provides us with an unprecedented opportunity to look at the 
career paths of quota and non-quota legislators developing alongside one another across a 
thirteen-year period in an identical context compared to existing studies of Western 
democracies which have been able to compare only women who were elected before and 
after the introduction of a quota (Murray, 2010a,b).iii Here we collate post-election career 
trajectory data for the 1997 newly elected cohort and add them to the existing aggregate 
dataset. Our analysis also takes account of candidate quality measures outlined above along 
with additional covariates such as MP tenure (whether the MP served the full thirteen years 
or not) and electoral majority obtained by the newly elected MP in the 1997 general election.  
Electoral performance: Do ‘quota women’ fare worse than non-quota candidates? 
The 1997 general election proved fruitful for AWS candidates with 35 of the 38 being 
elected. Table 2 details how AWS candidates fared in comparison to Labour incumbents and 
new candidates. As a whole, AWS candidates fared much better than new non-quota women 
candidates, the vast majority of whom were selected in non-winnable seats, but there was 
little difference between them and new candidates as whole or by sex. Those AWS 
candidates in non-incumbent seats recorded the best performance. There is also little 
difference in the performance between AWS candidates standing in incumbent seats and non-
quota incumbent performance irrespective of sex. The descriptive evidence also suggests that 
the performance of AWS candidates did not significantly differ from non-quota candidates, 
other than new non-quota women candidates, the majority of which stood in opposition 
strongholds. However, to test whether there was any difference in any electoral performances 
between quota and non-quota candidates, it is necessary to take account of intervening 
variables - social cleavages and other electoral influences on Labour support - using a series 
of multivariate analyses.  
Table 2: Labour Performance in the 1997 General Election: Candidate Sex, Incumbent 
Candidate Sex, New Candidates and Sex, and All Women Shortlists 
Candidates Mean % 
LABVS 1997 
Mean % LABVS 
+/-92-97 
Labour Candidate Sex   
All Labour Woman Candidates (159) 43.10% +9.24% 
All Labour Male Candidates (481) 46.61% +9.61% 
   
Labour Incumbent Candidates   
Labour Incumbent Candidates (238) 60.95% +8.73% 
   
Labour Incumbent Seats & Candidate Sex   
Women Incumbent Candidates1 (39) 57.50% +8.46% 
Male Incumbent Candidates (199) 61.62% +8.79% 
   
New Candidates & Sex   
All New Candidates (403) 36.78% +9.99% 
All New Women Candidates2 (120) 38.41% +9.49% 
All New Male Candidates (283) 36.09% +10.21% 
All New Women Non AWS candidates (82) 33.80% +8.95% 
   
New Candidates: All Women Shortlists   
All Women Shortlist Candidates (38) 48.37% +10.66% 
All Women Shortlist Candidates (Incumbent) (7) 57.13% +8.11% 
All Women Shortlist Candidates (Non-Incumbent) (31) 46.39% +11.23% 
1 Includes AWS incumbent candidates (7). 2 Includes all AWS candidates (38). Note that all 
1992 seat type and vote is based on 1992 notional vote shares due to extensive redistricting in 
1997.  
 
To test these relationships we use standard OLS regression models. Previous evidence from 
the 2010 and 2005 general election suggests that AWS seats are selected according to number 
of criteria including the proximity to other women, seats where the retired incumbent was a 
woman, region, early selection in the electoral cycle and, in some cases, the marginality 
(Cutts et al, 2008). As a consequence, there is a possibility of selection bias, unobserved 
heterogeneity and endogeneity bias which may cause inconsistent estimates if they are not 
deal with appropriately (Cutts and Widdop, 2012). Here we attempted to use an instrumental 
variable (IV) approach (Angrist et al, 1996) and propensity score matching (Rosenbaum and 
Rubin, 1985) with limited success. For instance, the instruments used lacked explanatory 
power in the first stage of the model, and their continued use in the modelling process could 
themselves lead to biased estimates.iv After calculating propensity scores, we found little 
difference between AWS and non-AWS seats, although this finding must be treated with 
caution given that the method is dependent on re-estimating the propensity score until the 
distribution is fairly similar between control and treatment groups, and our sample of the 
treatment group (in this case AWS seats) is relatively small.v Given the unreliability of these 
estimates, it was decided to use conventional OLS regression models.  
Previous evidence suggests that if AWS candidates suffer an electoral penalty then it is 
because of being new candidates rather than being women or being selected by a quota (Cutts 
et al, 2008; Cutts and Widdop, 2012). Here we split our quota variable by incumbency to 
reflect that AWS candidates were selected to stand both in incumbent and non-incumbent 
seats. We also include two separate new candidate variables – for women and men standing 
in non-incumbent seats – who weren’t selected by a quota. These are compared against 
incumbent candidates, both men and women. The linear models are built incrementally over 
three stages to examine how these quota and non-quota variables are affected when other 
covariates are added. The first stage is the null model and includes the main variables of 
interest without any additional covariates. The second stage includes three socio-economic 
factors that capture the social cleavages in voting patterns, control variables to measure the 
sex of Conservative and Liberal Democrat candidates as well these parties’ campaign 
spending, which act as a proxy for local campaigning. The final stage takes account of 
previous Labour vote share in 1992. This alters the interpretation of the model by 
determining the influence of these variables on Labour vote change where continuity of 










Table 3: OLS Regressions: Impact of Quota and Non-Quota Candidates on Labour 
Support in the 1997 General Election 
Variables       Model 1 
    β          SE 
      Model 2 
     β         SE 
Model 3 
     β        SE 
Constant  59.18*  (1.44)  53.39*  (3.92)  12.25* (2.80) 
Base: All Labour Incumbent 
Candidates  
   
AWS (Quota) Incumbent -10.75   (11.80) -6.89     (7.85) -2.28    (3.59) 
AWS (Quota) Non-Incumbent -15.89*  (5.43) -0.77     (3.98)  2.47    (1.83) 
Labour New Non-Quota Woman  
Candidates (non-incumbent) 
-33.99*  (3.81) -15.53* (3.07) -3.48*  (1.54) 
Labour New Non-Quota Male 
Candidates (non-incumbent)  
-24.40*  (2.68) -9.13*   (2.21) -0.43    (1.11) 
Opposition Candidates    
Gender Conservative Candidate -  1.27     (2.26)  0.39     (1.03) 
Gender Lib Dem Candidate - -0.43     (1.80) -0.40     (0.82) 
Social Cleavages    
Factor 1: ‘Working class’ -  3.68*   (1.19)  0.04    (0.58) 
Factor 2: ‘Affluent suburbs’ - -3.76*   (0.94) -0.43    (0.45) 
Factor 3: ‘Retirement and Rural’ - -0.89     (1.05) -0.95*  (0.47) 
Party Campaigning    
Labour 1997 Spending -  0.16*   (0.04)  0.05*   (0.02) 
Conservative 1997 Spending - -0.07     (0.04)  0.01     (0.02) 
Lib Dem 1997 Spending - -0.14*   (0.03) -0.04*   (0.02) 
Nationalist 1997 Spending - -0.13*   (0.03) -0.02     (0.02) 
Previous Vote Share    
% 1992 Labour vote share - -  0.83*   (0.04) 
Model Fit    
R2 0.57 0.84 0.97 
*<0.05 = significant 
 
Table 3 contains the results of the regression analyses. Following the inclusion explanatory 
variables, the R2 values show that these explain 84 per cent of the variation in 1997 Labour 
vote share. This increases to 97 per cent when previous Labour vote share is added. In model 
one, both quota and non-quota new candidates standing in non-incumbent seats have a 
significant negative effect on 1997 Labour vote share when compared against incumbent 
candidates. The coefficients are much larger for new non-quota candidates than AWS 
candidates suggesting that the latter performed relatively well compared to this group. 
Interestingly, there was no significant difference between AWS candidates standing in 
incumbent seats and non-quota incumbent candidates. Put simply, being selected by quota in 
an incumbent seat made little difference to Labour’s electoral performance in 1997. Closer 
inspection of the model with socio-economic cleavages and campaign influences on Labour 
support reveals that this finding holds with no additional penalty for AWS candidates in 
incumbent seats. The inclusion of covariates in model two, however, does reveal that AWS 
candidates standing in non-incumbent seats fared much better than new non-quota candidates, 
with the latter for both men and women remaining negatively significant at the 95 per cent 
level, while the former was insignificant.  
This model seems robust with the explanatory variables influencing 1997 Labour vote share 
in ways that one would expect: for instance, the more Labour campaigned, the higher their 
vote share; Labour did better in working class areas and their vote was lower in affluent 
suburban constituencies. After controlling for social cleavages and other factors, it seems that 
AWS candidates in non-incumbent seats actually performed better than other new candidates 
and didn’t perform significantly better or worse than those incumbent candidates standing in 
Labour held seats. Even when prior vote is controlled for, this finding holds, with new non-
quota women standing in non-incumbent seats performing significantly worse than men non-
quota and quota women candidates, when compared against Labour incumbent candidates. In 
a similar manner, there is no significant difference, when previous vote shared is added, 
between non-quota and AWS incumbent candidates. Our findings suggest that there is clearly 
no evidence of an AWS effect. Labour did not suffer an electoral penalty in 1997 where they 
selected AWS candidates whether it was in seats they previously held or where they were 
challenging, and thus we can reject HA(1). 
 
Candidate quality: Are elected ‘quota women’ less qualified than newly elected non-
quota candidates? 
A number of candidate characteristics and measures of political experience have been 
generally accepted as proxies for ‘qualifications’ for office to highlight differences and 
similarities between ‘quota women’ and other parliamentarians of both sexes (Franceschet 
and Piscopo, 2012; 2008; Murray, 2010b; 2012). Differences might suggest a disparity of 
notional preparedness for office in some direction between the two groups, whereas similarity 
would suggest otherwise. To test these differences, we examine a subset of 178 newly elected 
candidates – both quota and non-quota – at the 1997 general election. We employ a series of 
bivariate regression analyses to examine the relationship between the process of selection (by 
quota or not), their demographic characteristics and their political quality. As noted above, 
the inconsistent implementation of the AWS policy allows us to distinguish between sex and 
quota effects.  
Our first set of analyses examines the relationship between the process of selection, age and 
education. Eleven of the twenty nine newly elected non-quota women were under the age of 
40 with three elected MPs under the age of 30. Only three of the 114 new elected non-quota 
male candidates were under 30. There were no ‘quota women’ aged less than 30 and only 
five of the 35 elected under the age of 40. Closer inspection of the data suggests that there is 
actually little difference in the average age of quota and non-quota newly elected MPs: on 
average, newly elected non-quota men were aged 44; non quota women were 42 and quota 
women were 45. This is borne out in the bivariate OLS regressions. There is no statistically 
significant difference between AWS women and those elected from seats which held open 
selection contests. This finding holds when both AWS women and non-quota women are 
compared against newly elected non-quota men.vi A similar story is evident when we 
examine education. More than 75% of those newly elected MPs – both quota and non-quota 
and irrespective of sex – either had an undergraduate degree or better. As a consequence, 
there was no significant difference in education between ‘quota women’ and non-quota 
elected MPs or where non-quota MPs was differentiated by sex, and we can reject HA(2A).vii 
Alongside age and education there are three other measures of ‘political quality’ used in the 
existing literature: having previously contested a parliamentary election, experience of 
serving on a local legislature, and occupational experience in national politics. The ‘blooding’ 
of candidates is a common form of political experience in Britain, whereby candidates run for 
election in parliamentary seats considered unwinnable for their party as a rite of passage 
(Norris and Lovenduski, 1995). This is arguably a useful measure of ‘quality’ in the British 
case, acting as a direct measure of political experience as well as a proxy measure of party 
loyalty. It is also common in Britain for legislators at the national level to have had previous 
experience of politics at a local level, most notably through elected service on local councils. 
In terms of candidate selection process, local experience is widely considered to be a positive 
attribute as it provides candidates with local contacts, practical experience, and public 
exposure (Norris and Lovenduski, 1995). In recent decades, British MPs have increasingly 
entered the House of Commons following prior employment in national politics, such as 
being a staffer for a political party or holding a position in the press which involves contact 
with the political world (Allen, 2013). Having professional occupational experience in 
politics provides an opportunity for an individual to spend time at Westminster, often in close 
proximity to sitting politicians, and to make contacts which may prove useful when either 
seeking selection for a parliamentary seat, or indeed when seeking ministerial promotion if 
elected. On the other hand, having such experience may leave ‘quota women’ open to charges 
of leadership nepotism, as seen in other countries using gender quotas (Sater, 2012).  
But are newly elected quota women less qualified than their non-quota colleagues? Here we 
test for any relationship between newly elected quota women and non-quota MPs and these 
measures of ‘political quality’ separately using a series of bivariate binary logistic 
regressions. The results are shown in Table 4. Our findings suggest that ‘quota’ women are 
no more likely to have contested a parliamentary seat or have experience of being a local 
councillor than non-quota newly elected MPs (see Model 1a and 2a). Even when we 
differentiate non-quota elected MPs by sex (Models 1b and 2b), quota and non-quota women 
are less likely than men to hold electoral experience at the national or local level, but neither 
are significant at the 95% level, although the former is at the 90% level. Model 3a and 3b test 
for any differences in occupational experience between newly elected quota and non-quota 
MPs. Although ‘quota women’ are more likely to have more occupational political 
experience than non-quota MPs, this isn’t significant at the 95% level. When we differentiate 
non-quota MPs by sex (see Model 3b), we find evidence of a sex effect with non-quota 
women significantly more likely to have occupational experience in politics than non-quota 
men. The coefficient for ‘quota woman’ remains positive and insignificant. In sum, we can 
reject HA(2B). 
Table 4: Logistic Regressions: Impact of Quota and Non Quota MPs on Measures of 
‘Candidate Quality’ 
Variables Model 1a 
Contested 
Parlt Election 
    β        SE 
Model 2a 
Been a Local 
Councillor 




     β        SE 
Constant  0.32   (0.17)  0.95*  (0.19)  0.59*  (0.18) 
Base: Non-Quota( Open List) 
MPs 
   
AWS (Quota) MPs -0.20   (0.39) -0.03   (0.42)  0.53    (0.38) 
Model Fit    
-2 Log Likelihood 240.70 211.39 234.81 
Nagelkerke R2 0.02 0.00 0.02 
    Model 1b 
Contested 
Parlt Election 
    β        SE 
Model 2b 
Been a Local 
Councillor 




     β       SE 
Constant  0.18    (0.19)  1.22*  (0.22) -0.77* (0.20) 
Base: Male Non-Quota( Open 
List) MPs 
   
AWS (Quota) MPs -0.35   (0.40) -0.21   (0.43)  0.72   (0.39) 
Non-Quota( Open List) 
Women MPs 
-0.79   (0.46) -0.77   (0.44)  0.84* (0.42) 
Model Fit    
-2 Log Likelihood 237.50 208.32 230.85 
Nagelkerke R2 0.03 0.03 0.04 
*<0.05 = significant 
The measures of ‘political quality’ assessed in Table 4 suggest that the political backgrounds 
of ‘quota women’ are a little closer to those of men, particularly in terms of contesting 
parliamentary elections and being a local councillor, than that of women elected from open 
lists. Are such findings counter-intuitive? To some extent, they run contrary to criticisms of 
gender quotas which focus on candidate quality as they suggest that, in fact, by accepted 
metrics, ‘quota women’ are actually better qualified than non-quota women (Dahlerup and 
Friedenvall, 2010). One possible explanation lies in the fact that all AWS selections for the 
1997 general election had to occur relatively early in the electoral cycle, at least 16 months 
prior to the general election itself. Those candidates who had previously sought seats 
unsuccessfully may have put themselves forward for selection earlier in the cycle, whilst 
first-time candidates may have taken longer to make the decision to run. By the common 
metrics used to measure ‘quality’, these candidates with greater previous political 
involvement are more qualified. Similarly, the AWS policy was largely focused on those 
seats which Labour had either previously held or was likely to be highly competitive in the 
general election. Given the targeting strategy of the party in 1997, it is possible that these 
seats were home to extremely active local constituency organisations which counted 
numerous ‘qualified’ women in their ranks. It could be the case that the party targeted seats 
where a likely woman candidate was already in place, so as to avoid unnecessary rancour 
between centre and periphery (Childs and Cowley, 2011).  
Additionally, this can be linked to debates within the literature on gender quotas, as well as 
women in politics more broadly, which question the ‘double bind’ that many women 
politicians face (Franceschet, Krook and Piscopo, 2012; Murray, 2010b). Women politicians, 
including those elected through the use of a gender quota are generally expected to replicate 
existing norms of pre-legislative political experience There is often pressure on women in 
politics to be transformative in some way and to disrupt male norms of political behaviour 
(Cowley and Childs, 2003; Lovenduski, 2005).  A clear tension exists here, and as a 
consequence, it is perhaps not that surprising that quota women were not that different from 
their male non-quota colleagues, as such similarity is an informal prerequisite for 
successfully becoming a national-level politician. 
Political Careers: Are elected ‘quota women’ less likely to achieve high office than 
newly elected non-quota candidates? 
Much  of the scholarly work which addresses the impact of gender quotas focuses on either 
the descriptive representation of women in political legislatures and executives or the ways in 
which this ‘presence’ affects substantive representation (Childs and Krook, 2009; Murray, 
2012). Here we focus on the descriptive representation of women in 1997 across different 
levels of the parliamentary and executive hierarchy.viii There is a hierarchy of offices within 
British government. Beginning at the top, Cabinet positions rank highest, followed by 
Ministers of State, then Under-secretaries of state, and finally parliamentary private 
secretaries (PPS). Many MPs do not achieve any of these offices and remain on the 
backbenches for the duration of their time in the Commons.ix Owing to sample size 
considerations, we combine cabinet and minister of state positions, which gives us a scale of 
four different levels of office. For the purpose of our analysis, this is used as our dependent 
variable to measure career success in the years up until the 2010 election and the removal of 
the Labour government, or when an MP left parliament through retirement or electoral loss, 
whichever comes first.  
Because the dependent variable has ordered categories, we employ an ordered logistic model 
to test for whether there are any significant differences in the post-election legislative career 
of quota and non-quota MPs.x We also include the measures of ‘political quality’ used earlier 
to examine, for example, whether those MPs with previous political experience are 
significantly more likely to progress up the legislative career ladder. Two additional 
covariates are also added: tenure of the MP and a MPs electoral majority in 1997. The former 
is a binary variable which takes account of whether those elected in 1997 remained an MP 
until 2010. Of the 178 new Labour cohort in 1997, 15 retired, one died and 34 were defeated 
at the ballot box before the 2010 general election. Put simply, incumbency over the thirteen 
years was not wholly dependent on the marginality of the seat. We also take account of a 
MPs electoral majority in 1997. Those quota and non-quota MPs elected in safe seats are 
more likely to have greater longevity, notwithstanding death or retirement. However, it is also 
possible that parties may be more likely to select a talented, potential ‘high flyer’ in a safe 
seat to ensure that such experience, expertise and ability can be utilised in executive positions 
for a considerable length of time. As such, this variable also acts as a proxy for potential 
talent and ability.  
The main findings and the model fit statistics from the ordered logistic model are shown in 
Table 5. When compared against men non-quota MPs, we find that being a newly elected 
AWS quota MP or a non-quota women MP did not have any significant influence on a MPs 
post-election legislative career. This finding is hardly surprising. Only five women in the 
newly elected 1997 cohort made it to Cabinet level: Yvette Cooper was Secretary of State for 
Work and Pensions, Hazel Blears for Communities and Local Government, Patricia Hewitt 
for Health (and Trade and Industry), Ruth Kelly for Transport (and Education and 
Communities and Local Government), and Jacqui Smith was Home Secretary. Of this group, 
Jacqui Smith is the only one to be selected from an AWS, but in terms of office achievement, 
she arguably held the most prestigious of all those listed here, with Home Secretary being one 
of the four ‘Great Offices of State’ (Berlinski, et al, 2007). As a consequence, any argument 
which claims that ‘quota women’ were discriminated against by the gatekeepers of executive 
office is difficult to substantiate and we can reject HA(3). The models in Table 5 suggest that 
overall they were not, but given that more women were elected through AWS than women 
from an open list, their general lack of presence in the executive is a little surprising. 
 
Table 5: Ordered Logistic Regression: Impact of Quota and Non Quota MPs on Post-
Election Legislative Career 
Variables     β        SE     bStdXY      SDofX 
Base: Male Non-Quota( Open List) MPs  
AWS (Quota) MPs -0.03   (0.36)      -0.01           0.40 
Non-Quota( Open List) Women MPs  0.04   (0.39)       0.01            0.37 
Candidate Quality  
Age -0.12* (0.02)      -0.40           7.38 
Degree level Education  0.93* (0.38)       0.17            0.41 
Occupational Political Experience  0.06   (0.32)       0.01            0.49 
Previously Contested Parliamentary Seat -0.17   (0.32)      -0.04           0.49 
Local Councillor  0.04   (0.44)       0.01            0.45 
Additional Covariates  
Tenure of MP  1.25* (0.44)       0.26            0.46 
Electoral Majority in 1997  0.04* (0.02)       0.22           13.63 
Model Fit  
Pseudo Log Likelihood -194.02 
Wald Chi-Square 56.81* 
Nagelkerke R2 0.14 
*<0.05 = significant 
 
A number of the candidate quality measures – previously contested a parliamentary election, 
experience as a local councillor, occupational political experience – also had no effect. But 
age and education did matter: the younger the MP in 1997 the more likely they were to 
achieve the higher executive positions; those MPs with degrees were significantly more likely 
to be employed in the executive.xi To gauge the effects of these variables, we can interpret the 
Y-standardized and fully standardized coefficients as the change (measured in standard 
deviations) in latent Y variable per unit of X or per standard deviation of X. In this case, a 
one standard deviation increase in age (which is 7.4 years) decreases an MP achieving an 
executive position during their legislative career by .40 standard deviations. As regards 
education, one standard deviation increase in having a degree increases whether a MP reaches 
top office by .17 standard deviations. Those MPs who remained in Westminster for the 
duration of the Labour government from 1997 to 2010 were significantly more likely to gain 
executive office. This was also the case for those newly elected MPs who had the largest 
electoral majorities in 1997. A one standard deviation increase in electoral majority (which is 
13.63 per cent) increases whether a MP served in the executive during Labour’s thirteen year 
period in power by 0.22 standard deviations.  
Conclusion 
In this article, we have measured the quality of women elected via a gender quota at three 
stages of their political careers – their electoral performance in 1997, their pre-legislative 
qualifications for office, and their post-election legislative careers. Overall, we find very few 
statistically significant differences between the performance on these metrics of ‘quota 
women’ compared to their male and female colleagues elected without the use of a gender 
quota. 
We found no evidence of an AWS effect in 1997 and were able to reject HA(1). Labour did 
not suffer any electoral penalty in 1997 where they selected quota or AWS candidates 
whether it was in challenging or incumbent seats. Interestingly there was some evidence that 
new non-quota women standing in non-incumbent seats performed significantly worse than 
men non-quota and quota women candidates. However, this may have reflected the late 
selection of these seats given the relatively early selection of AWS candidates, and possibly 
the disproportionate selection of non-quota women in unwinnable seats, with the remaining 
priority seats more likely to be taken by men (Childs, 2000). In terms, of their levels of 
education, age at time of election, and other multiple measures of political ‘quality, we found 
no evidence of any significant differences between quota and non-quota MPs and can reject 
HA (2A, 2B). If anything, particularly in the case of standing previously for Westminster and 
being a local councillor, newly elected AWS MPs were a little closer to men than women 
elected through open lists. Finally, we found no significant difference in the post-election 
career trajectories of AWS women and their colleagues within the House of Commons and 
can reject HA(3). Crucially, we find no significant relationship between being elected 
through a gender quota and the attainment of higher executive office, a finding that resembles 
those of existing research (Bauer and Burnet, 2013; Murray, 2010b).  
Put simply, we contend that the evidence presented here demonstrates that ‘quota women’ are 
not discriminated against by voters, are equally qualified for office as their colleagues and are 
not perceived negatively by the gatekeepers to executive office. Although limited to Britain 
in terms of generalizability by virtue of the data, these findings contribute to an expanding 
literature that considers the interaction of equality guarantees and candidate quality. Our 
findings additionally hold relevance for the wider gender and politics literature, raising 
questions of how the descriptive representation of ‘quota women’ in executive roles affects 
the substantive representation of women. They also raise questions about the aims of gender 
quotas, specifically the relationship between the descriptive numeric representation of women 
and their substantive representation. To what extent is it normatively desirable for women 
elected via a gender quota to hold social, educational, and political backgrounds which are 
broadly similar to the men who have previously dominated political legislatures? (Childs and 
Krook, 2012; Franceschet, Krook and Piscopo, 2012) As interest in the ideas of a political 
class and the professionalization of politics grow (Borchert and Zeiss, 2003; Oborne, 2007), 
this article provides an insight into how gender quotas fit into this debate, highlighting the 
overall similarity of British ‘quota women’ to their colleagues, both male and female, 
selected through traditional procedures. Whether or not this similarity aids or hinders the 
potential for gender quotas to result in transformative substantive representation is a question 
for future research in this area, and should build on recent institutionalist considerations of 
how representatives from traditionally underrepresented groups adapt to the long-standing 
norms of the institutions they enter (Celis and Wauters, 2010). Broadly, however, advocates 
of gender quotas should be emboldened by our findings and oppose negative perceptions of 
‘quota women’ where they encounter them. 
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Table A1: Socio-Economic Variables: Principal Components Analysis Varimax-Rotated 
Component Loadings 
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Notes. Components with Eigenvalues > 1 are retained. Rotated component loadings 
(varimax rotation) greater than 0.4 shown.  
 
 
                                                             
i In a single-member majoritarian system, a quota can be perceived as a zero-sum conflict 
between men and women candidates (Cowley and Childs, 2011), a conflict that would be less 
direct under a party list system. Proportional systems tend to have more women legislators 
regardless of quota imposition so it could be argued that the implementation of a quota will 
alter the political landscape less than it would for a country with a small number of women 
legislators. 
 
ii Of the sixty-five newly elected women at the 1997 General Election, Sylvia Heal was first 
elected in 1990 and served initially until the 1992 election before losing her seat before 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
running again in 1997. To ensure that all those women being studied are starting from the 
same position (i.e. new to parliament) we decided not to include her in the analysis. 
 
iii In her study of Uganda, Diana O’Brien compares women elected to reserved seats for 
women to men and women elected as ‘county representatives’. 
 
iv We used a number of instruments: marginality, region, proximity to women and retired 
women incumbents. The instruments did not prove to be relevant in accounting for selection 
and further use would have led to inconsistent and misleading findings. Part of the problem is 
the sample size of AWS seats which was relatively small in the 1997 general election.  
 
v We calculated the conditional probability of receiving a treatment using a logistic regression 
of the probability of treatment as a function of the observed covariates. The small sample size 
of the treatment group makes it very difficult to get any meaningful findings particularly 
when it was necessary to distinguish between selections made in Labour incumbent and non-
incumbent seats.  
 
vi Where age is the outcome variable, the coefficient for AWS newly elected MPs was 1.10 
(SE = 1.39) when compared against those MPs elected through an open list. Where newly 
elected male MPs was the base category, the AWS new elected MPs coefficient remained 
positive but insignificant 0.68 (SE = 1.24) whereas the coefficient for newly elected non-
quota women was negative and insignificant -2.03 (SE = 1.53).  
 
vii Where education is treated as a continuous outcome variable, the coefficient for AWS 
newly elected MPs was 0.07 (SE = 0.17) when compared against open list MPs. Where 
newly elected male MPs was the base category, the AWS new elected MPs coefficient 
remained insignificant 0.11 (SE = 0.17). The coefficient for newly elected non-quota women 
was also insignificant 0.21 (SE = 0.19). 
 
viii We argue that the executive presence of women can be seen as a ‘hard’ form of descriptive 
representation, and existing research suggests that it is likely to lead to the increased 
substantive representation of women at best, and a greater awareness of women’s issues 
within the core executive at worst (Annesley and Gains, 2010). 
 
ix Of the entire 1997 intake of 242 MPs elected for the first time from all parties, just over 
35% remained on the backbenches for the duration of their time in the Commons, or for the 
entire three-term, thirteen year period of the Labour’s tenure in office. 
 
x To test the proportional odds assumption we use the Omodel command in STATA which 
provides us with a likelihood ratio test. The null hypothesis is that there is no difference in the 
coefficients between the models. We obtain a likelihood ratio chi-square value of 17.44 
(prob>chi² = 0.49) which reveals no violation of the assumption. The Brant test of parallel 
regression assumption provides further evidence of no violation in the assumption: Chi 
square value of 14.92 (prob>chi² = 0.67). This suggests that the ordered logistic approach is 
an appropriate modelling procedure in this case.  
xi There is no evidence of any collinearity here with the other candidate quality measures. If 
age and education are removed from the model, all the remaining candidate quality measures 
remain insignificant.  
